COMPLIMENTS OF THE AUTHOR 



: 473 
54 
.L55 
:opy 1 



GENERAL BEAUREGARD 
AT SHILOH 



THC GRAHAM PRESS. 430-32 COMMON ST.. N. O LA. 



PREFACE 

GENEEAL BEAUEEGAED AT SHILOH, 
Sunday, April 6, 1863. 



Having- been an active participant in the famous campaign of 
Shiloh, from beginning to end^ desirous of establisliing a correct 
record of the maneuvering of General Beauregard at that battle, 
during the first day's fight, Sunday, April 6, 1862, I submit the 
following pages, the result of honest researches from official docu- 
ments and other means at my disposal, my desire being naught 
but a knowledge of the truth of history and its dissemination for 
the sake of our children, the honest student of history and the fu- 
ture generations, avoiding all namby-pamby. 

Y. E. Le Monnier, M. D., 

Ex-Private, Company B, Ci'escent Regiment, Louisiana Infantry, 
Ponds' Brigade, Rugglcs Division, Bragg' s Corps, Army of the 
Mississippi. 

Xew Orleans, La., October, 1913. 



-.■^2,r?3 



General Beauregard at 

Shiloh, Sunday, April 6/62 



By Y. R. LeMonnier, M. D. 

Ex-Fiitate, Company B, Crescent Begiment, Louisiana Infantry, 
Pond's Brigade, Puiggles' Division, Bragg's Corps, Army of 
the Mississippi. 



COL. WILLIAM PEESTO^ JOHXSTOX, son of Gen. Al- 
bert Sidney Johnston, in his "Life of Gen. A. S. Johnston," 
page 637, asserts that General Beauregard, by ordering the 
retreat of the Confederate army before 6 P. M. on Sunday, x\pril 
6, the first day of the fight, lost the fruit of the victory that General 
Johnston had achieved. What are the facts in support of this as- 
sertion? For Col. W. P. Johnston to say that General Beauregard 
ordered the retreat before 6 P. M., — and others who were in Eich- 
mond while we were fighting also say so, — is most preposterous and 
ridiculous, for it is well known and admitted by these very assertors 
that General Prentiss, with some 2250 of his men, surrendered at 
5 :30 P. M. on Sunday. 

As I was one of the many privates who were at this surrender, I 
know whereof I speak when I say that between 5 :30 and 6 o'clock 
my regiment, the Crescent, came by a flank movement to the north 
of the Duncan Field into an old country road, and as we entered it 
three Federals came out of the woods on our left, one of whom was 
General Prentiss, and as we cheered, — after having been ordered to 
cease firing by our colonel, Marshall J. Smith, for they had surren- 
dered, — General Prentiss stepped forward and said at the top of his 
voice : "Let them cheer, let tliem cheer ; for they have this day 
captured the finest brigade in the United States army." The sun 
on that date sets at 6 :10 P. M., and the long shadows of the trees 
that covered the country road that we were in told plainly that night 
Avould soon put a stop to that terrible carnage, — to the terrible car- 
nage that liad commenced on that beautiful Sabbath day at 4:55 



A. M., thirteen hours before. To say, therefore, that General 
Beauregard ordered the retreat as early as -i P. M. of the first day 
of the fight is so puerile that I am astonished that such men as 
Colonel Johnston, Mr. Davis, the President of the Confederacy^ 
and others high in position should accept such an assertion as fact. 

But let us examine their empty arguments to see what is con- 
cealed in such an unjust assertion, and you will learn something- 
from the knowledge of a private who on that memorable occasion 
did his duty from the time he was aroused from his sleep in his 
tent at Corinth on the morning of April 3d to the 10th, eight days 
afterward, when he returned to camp, slushy and muddy from head 
to foot, with two muskets, one a trophy from the battle-field. This 
private has no enemy to punish, no friend to reward. To the best 
of his ability he performed his duty throughout the war, and he 
now demands that the truth of this terrible struggle between the 
states be better known to the coming generation, no matter on 
whose toes one steps, and even if what he says is displeasing to 
hero idolaters who can see the flaw in their enemy's eye but will not 
see the l^eam in that of their idol. 

Mr. Davis, in his "Eise and Fall of the Confederacy,*' volume 2, 
pages 54 et seq., frequently repeats what Col. W. P. Johnston, a 
colonel on his staff, says in his account of the life of his father ; but 
both Mr. Davis and Colonel Johnston were in Eichmond, Ya., the 
capital of the Confederacy, while we were fighting at Shiloh on the 
banks of the Tennessee Eiver, hundreds of miles away. Therefore 
they cannot know what one knows who participated in this mo- 
mentous campaign, from camp to battle and from battle back ta 
camp, a distance of twenty-three miles. Is the colonel the mouth- 
piece of the president, or is this one his echo? Be this as it may, 
it is to be regretted that both these authorities fall into the same 
errors. Their D'el'enda est Cartliago is that General Beauregard lost 
the fruit of victory by ordering a retreat at 4 JP'. j\I. on Sunday, 
one hour and a half after General Johnston had been killed. How 
can that be when at 4 P. M. the hardest fighting that took place 
during these two days was being waged at the Hornets' Xest, where 
charges after charges had been made and repulsed with terrible 
slaughter, where in one of these charges the 18th Louisiana after 
4 P. M. in ten minutes lost 42 per cent, of those engaged, where 
these terrible repulses continued until 5 :30, when General Prentiss 
surrendered after having been surrounded. 

But let us follow the author. Colonel Johnston, in his narrative 
of "A Victory Lost," pages 627 et seq. He commences bv pulilish- 
ing the telegram of General Beauregard to the Adjutant General^ 



then comes his brief report of the conclusion of Sunday's battle, 
"• . . . it was after 6 P. M., as before said, when the enemy's 
last position was carried. . . ." As I have said above, having 
been present I know what occurred. This last position of the enemy 
was the surrender of General Prentiss in the Hornets' Nest at 5 :30 
P. M. General Polk says ("Life of General Johnston," page 630), 
*' About 5 P. M. my line attacked the enemy's troops, — the last that 
Avere left upon the field, — in an encampment on my right. The at- 
tack Avas made in front and flank. . . . General Prentiss de- 
livered his sword with his command to Colonel Eussell, one of my 
brigade commanders, who turned him over to me. The prisoners 
turned over were about 2000. . . ." 

It is A^ery CAddent that if General Prentiss surrendered after 5 
o'clock, Avith 2000 or more prisoners, that it Avas at least 6 1:)efore 
they had stacked their arms and moved out of the Hornets' Nest 
on their Avay to Corinth, the rear. Therefore General Beauregard 
is i-ight when he says it was after 6 o'clock when the enemy's last 
position Avas carried. If the last position were carried at or after 
6 P. jM., AA'hich is admitted by all, hoAv could we be retreating at 
4 P. M. ? In capturing this position, instead of retreating Ave were 
advancing, for Ave were following the enemy, one and a quarter 
miles to his last position, on that hill a quarter-mile from tlie river 
(Pittsburg Landing). Says the Federal Maj. D. W. Reed, in the 
rcA'ised edition of his book on the battle of Shiloh and the organiza- 
tions engaged, page 19 : "During the afternoon Colonel Webster, 
chief of artillery on General Grant's staff, had placed Madison's 
l)attery of siege guns in position about a quarter-mile out from the 
Landing, and then, as the l^atteries came back from the front, placed 
them in ]iosition to the right and left of the siege guns. . . . 
x\l)out 5 o'clock Ammen's brigade of Nelson's division of the army of 
the Ohio (Buell's) reached the field, the 36th Indiana taking posi- 
tion near the left in support of Stone's battery. Two gunboats, 
the Tyler and Lexington, were at the mouth of Dill Branch, just 
al;ove the Londing." 

During the battle Ave, the Confederates, did not and could not 
know the topography of the ground on which the Federals Avere 
contending and still less their advantages; but to-day, fifty years 
afterAvard, noAV that this piece of ground has been most carefully 
surveyed and converted into a beautiful park, those of us that have 
lieen over it haA'e studied it and consequently knoAV it, and we can 
account noAv for the many errors made Avhen it is stated that Ave 
were nearly or entirely on the banks of the Tennessee Eiver. In 
one instance Dill Branch is erroneouslv mentioned bv Colonel John- 



ston as the Tennessee Eiver; in another, General iPolk says, speak- 
ing of the Hornets' Nest, that we were about half a mile from the 
river. The Hornets' iSTest is nearly one and a half miles from the 
Landing, as you will see by looking at the beautiful maps of that 
battle-field that have been made by U. S. Engineers for the govern- 
ment. I have these maps before me. Last September I went through 
that battle-field in company with Major Eeed, the thoroughly-posted 
historian of the park, and was much interested and surprised at 
what I saw and learned. There is no doubt that the Federals en 
masse were surprised on that to them fatal Sunday morning, for 
they did not expect our visit. Gen. Lew Wallace in his address on 
the dedication of the Indiana monuments at Shiloh, in "Indiana 
at Shiloh," pages 275 et seq., mentions this fact; and so does 
General Buell. A great number of them were at a given moment 
utterly demoralized and pellmell on the banks of the Tennessee 
and unable to go farther. We never did come so near to the Ten- 
nessee Eiver that "one more and determined assault would have 
brought us on its banks, with the Federals at our feet, had not 
General Beauregard ordered the retreat at 4 P. M." In the very 
words of Colonel Johnston, page 628, I say, "For this last allega- 
tion there is not the slightest warrant." 

Another proof that at 6 o'clock we were still fighting and beard- 
ing the lion in his den, the Federals on their ground, is to be found 
on page 621, where Colonel Johnston writes : "Immediately after 
the (Prentiss) surrender General Polk ordered such cavalry as 
he had in hand to charge the fleeing enemy. A detachment under 
Lieutenant- Colonel Miller dashed forward and intercepted a bat- 
tery, within 150 yards of the river, the 2d Michigan, and captured 
it before it could unlimber and open fire. A portion of this cavalry 
rode to the river and watered their horses." Of this incident Major 
Eeed says: "Colonel Lindsay, 1st Mississippi Cavalry (Miller was 
his lieutenant-colonel), charged upon and captured Eoss' battery 
(the 2d Michigan) as it was withdrawing from position near Hurl- 
burt's headquarters, and then with thirty or forty men crossed the 
head of Dill Branch and attempted to charge another battery, but 
finding himself in the presence of an infantry force managed to get 
back under the hill without damage." This cavalry and the skirm- 
ishers from Chalmers' and Jackson's brigades were the only Con- 
federate troops that came under musketry fire after the Prentiss and 
Wallace surrender." The "within 150 yards of the river" men- 
tioned above by the Colonel should be "150 yards of Dill Branch," 
which empties into the Tennessee Eiver a quarter-mile above Pitts- 
burg Landing. Where Eoss' 2d Michigan battery was captured, 



near Hurlburt's headquarters, is nearly or fully three-quarters of it 
mile from the river. From the fact that the enemy were on their 
chosen ground since March 17th and that its topography was well 
known to them, I conclude that the assertion of Major Eeed is 
the correct one. 

One word about Dill Branch and the gunboats. Where this, 
creek empties into the Tennessee Eiver is a ravine, extending some 
distance up, with high and abrupt bluffs and a marshy stream at 
their base, especially after heavy rains such as we had on the Friday 
night preceding the battle. Of course, the enemy knew this. On 
the north side of this creek, a quarterrmile from the river, Colonel 
Webster, chief of staff, had massed his siege guns and field bat- 
teries, and Ammen's brigade from Buell's army and other infantry 
supported them, while the gunboats at the mouth of this Dill 
Branch fired in the creek's valley, with the result, proved by reports, 
that many of our men were killed and wounded, denying thereby 
the assertion that their guns were so elevated that their shots here 
passed over our men. After Prentiss' surrender at and after 6 
o'clock the situation was : at Dill Branch, emptying at right angle 
into the Tennessee River, a quarter-mile above Pittsburg Landing, 
were, — on its south side, as near the Tennessee Eiver as the marshy 
condition of the land would allow, say a quarter-mile, — Clanton's 
Cavalry brigade, followed by and proceeding west from the river, 
which here runs due north, Chalmer's brigade, Gage's battery, 
and Jackson's, Anderson's, and Stephen's brigades, the 154th Ten- 
nessee regiment. Wood's brigade, the 12th and 13th Tennessee 
regiments; facing them on the north, with the creek and both its 
swampy sides and steep banks between them, was the enemy's line ■ 
of battle (last stand) extending from the river, 800 feet ( ?) to the 
Hamburg and Savannah road, three-quarters of a mile, and the gun- 
boats at the mouth of Dill Branch, Such were the situation and 
condition of things when night came, more than two hours after the 
time Messrs. Davis and Johnston and their adlierents say that- 
General Beauregard ordered tlie retreat. Out of 229 Official Re- 
ports not one of them mentions a cessation of hostilities nor a re- 
treat at or before 4 P. M. You can verify this statement by exam- 
ining the "War of the Rebellion," official records, and S. I. V, X. 
P. I, reports. General Beauregard, therefore, is right when he 
says, "It was after 6 P. M., as before said, when the enemy's last 
position was carried and his force finally broke and sought refuge 
behind a commanding eminence covering Pittsburg Landing. , , ." 

Wyeth, in his "Life of General Forrest," says, page 77 : "But 
other counsel prevailed, and between 4 and 5 o'clock in the after- 



noon Forrest received orders to fall back with Chalmer's brigade 
and camp upon the battle-field. Chalmers, on the contrary, in his 
official report (War Eecords loco citato, pages 550 and 551) says, 
"Our men struggled vainly to ascend the hill, which was very steep, 
making charge after charge without success, but continued to fight 
until night closed hostilities on both sides." 

Col. S. A. Lockett, General Bragg's chief engineer at Shiloh, in 
an article in "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," volume I, 
page 605, says: "The time consumed in gathering Prentiss' com- 
mand together, in taking their arms, in marching them to the rear, 
was inestimably valuable. . . . But after a while the Confed- 
erates were gotten into ranks, and a perfect line of battle was 
formed, with our left wing resting on Owl Creek and our right 
on the Tennessee Eiver. General Polk was on the left, then Bragg, 
then Breckinridge. In our front only one single point was showing 
fight, a hill crowned with artillery. I was with General Bragg, and 
rode with him along the front of his corps. I heard him say, over 
and over again, 'One more charge, my men, and we shall capture 
them all.' While this was going on a stailf officer (or rather, I think, 
it was one of the detached clerks of General Beauregard's head- 
quarters, for he wore no uniform) came up to General Bragg and 
said, 'The General directs that the pursuit be stopped; the victory 
is sufficiently complete ; it is needless to expose our men to the fire 
of the gunboats.' General Bragg said, 'My God ! was a victory ever 
sufficiently complete?' Then he added, 'Have you given the order 
to any one else ?' 'Yes, sir,' was the reply ; 'to General iP'olk, on your 
left; and if you will look to the left you will see that the order is 
being obeyed.' General Bragg looked and said, 'My God! My 
God ! it is too late !' and turning to me he said, 'Captain, carry 
the order to the troops on the right,' and to Captain Frank Par- 
ker, 'You carry it to the left.' In a short time the troops were all 
falling back — and the victory ivas lost." 

Of all I have ever heard and read concerning the battle of Shiloh 
this is one of the most singular assertions, and may I not, in the 
very words of Col. W. P. Johnston, repeat, "There is just enough 
of truth in all this to mislead." See the few lines from Chalmers' 
report cited above, in answer to Wyeth's assertion, in which he 
(Chalmers) says that "night closed hostilities on both sides." Gen- 
eral Anderson, who was on the left of General Chalmers when hos- 
tilities ceased, says (page 499, Reports, loco citato) : "It was now 
twilight. As soon as we had placed a hill between us and the gun- 
boats the troops moved slowly and apparently with reluctance from 
the direction of the river. It was 8 o'clock at night before we had 
reached a bivouac near General Bragg's headquarters." 



In "Battles and Leaders," volume I, page 606, Col. Alexander 
E. Chisolm, who was on General Beauregard's staff, says: "It so 
happened that I rejoined General Beauregard at a point near Shi- 
loh Chapel (having escorted General Prentiss from the field to 
General Beauregard) when General Bragg rode up from the front, 
and I heard him say in an excited manner : 'General ! Ave have 
carried everything before us to the Tennessee Kiver. I have ridden 
from Owl to Lick Creeks, and there is none of the enemy to be seen.' 
Beauregard quietly replied: 'Then, General, do not unnecessarily 
expose your command to the fire of the gunboats.' " Compare 
these quotations with the assertion of Col. S'. H. Lockett. Again 
says the Colonel, ". . . a staff officer (or rather, I think, it was 
one of the detailed clerks of General Beauregard's headquarters, 
for he wore no uniform)." Yet from a detailed clerk, wearing no 
uniform. General Bragg at such a momentous opportunity accepted 
such an order! I mention this only to show the ludicrousness of 
such a conclusion. That General Bragg should have said, "One 
more charge, my men, and we shall capture them all," was not 
only proper, but it was his duty to stimulate his men; he certainly 
should not have discouraged them. 

To-day, thanks to "The Battle of Shiloh" and its beautiful maps, 
by Maj. D. W. Eeed, we know what we did not and could not know 
during and soon after the battle, and here we read on page 20 : "In 
the meantime General Bragg made an effort to get troops into posi- 
tion on the left of Pittsburg road, but before arrangements were 
completed night came on and General Beauregard ordered all the 
troops withdrawn. The Confederate troops sought bivouacs on the 
field, some occupying captured Union camps and some returning to 
their bivouac of Saturday night. General Beauregard remained 
near Shiloh Church; General Polk retired to his Saturday night 
camp; General Bragg was with Beauregard near the church, occu- 
pying General Sherman's headquarters' camp ; General Hardee and 
General Withers encamped with Colonel Martin in Peabody camp; 
Trabue occupied camps of the 6th Iowa and 44th Ohio; Pond's 
brigade alone of the infantry troops remained in line of battle con- 
fronting the Union line." 

Col. David Urquhart, of General Bragg's staff, in a letter to Gen. 
Thomas Jordan, a general of the Confederate forces at Shiloh, 
dated Narragansett, E. I., August 25, 1880, says: "Subsequently 
I rejoined General Bragg, whom I met engaged with the Federal 
troops, who were now disputing every inch. At about sunset an 
order came from General Beauregard to withdraw, collect and re- 
organize the troops. ... At the time this order was given, the 



10 

plain truth must l^e told, our troops at the front were a thin line 
of exhausted men who Avere making: no furtlier headway and who 
were glad to receive orders to fall hack. At the same time, as I 
had myself previously reported to General Bragg, over one-third 
of the army were scattered in different parts of the field, loading 
themselves with plunder from the abandoned Federal camps." 

Out of 229 reports 32 from the Federals and 44 from the Confed- 
erates, 76 in all, give the hour at which the battle ceased, — namely, 
after 6 P. M. : not one says 4 P. M., or before 6 o'clock.* It is, 
therefore, evident that General Beauregard did not order the cessa- 

In loco citato, the following reports, Confederate and Federal, give 
the time of the cessation of hostilities, all about, at, or after 6 p. m.: 

Confederates: General Beauregard, page 384; Col. Jacob Thompson, 

A. D. C, page 400; Major-General L. Polk, page 409, says: "About 5 p.m. 
my line attacked the enemy's troops — the last that were left upon the 
field. . . . It proved to be General Prentiss and W. H. L. Wal- 
lace. . . . The prisoners turned over were about 2,000. 

And by an order from the commanding general they were withdrawn 
from the field." [As General Prentiss surrendered at 5:30 p. m. it is 
clear that it was after 6 when, through with Prentiss, we were able to 
advance. I was there and know such to be the case.] General Eussell, 
page 418; Colonel Vaughau, page 425; Major James A. McNeeley, page 
431; Lieutenant-Colonel O. F. Strahl, page 432; Lieutenant-Colonel C. D. 
Venable, page 434; Colonel A. W. Campbell, page, '435; Major General 

B. F. Cheatham, page 440; Colonel Preston Smith, page 448; Colonel 
George Manney, page 455; Major-General Bragg, pages 467 and 470; 
Brigadier-General Euggles, page 472; Colonel Hodge, page 493; Brigadier- 
General Patton Anderson, page 499; Colonel W. A. Stanley, page 509; 
Colonel, acting Brigadier-General, Pond, page 518; Colonel Looney, page 
526; Captain Ketclium, page 528; Brigadier-General Withers, command- 
ing division, page 534; Colonel Z. C. Deas, page 538; Brigadier-General 
Chalmers, page 551; Colonel Joseph Wheeler, page 559; Colonel John C. 
Moore, page 562; Lieutenant-General Hardee, pages 568 and 569; Major 
E. J. Harvey, page 577; Brigadier-General P. E. Cleburne, page 582; 
Colonel W. K. Patterson, page 599; Major John H. Kelley, page 601; 
Major A. B. Hardcastle, page 603; Colonel E. P. Trabue, commanding 
brigade, page 161; Colonel J. D. Martin, commanding brigade, page 622; 
Colonel Isaac L. Dunlop, page 625. 

Federals: General Grant, page 109; Major-General McClernand, 
page 114; Colonel M. M. Crocker, pages 125 and 132; Colonel C. C. Marsh, 
l)age 134; Colonel J. M. Tuttle, page 149; Colonel J. J. Woods, page 151; 
Lieutenant-Colonel J. C. Parrott, page 150; Colonel Wm. T. Shaw, page 
154; Colonel B. S. Compton, page 161; Colonel J. L. Geddes, page 167; 
Captain H. Eichardson, page 167; Lieutenant-Colonel John A. Eawlins, 
A. A. G., page 188; Brigadier-General S. A. Hurlbut, page 205; Colonel 
I. C. Pugh, page 212; Major John Warner, page 218; Captain L. D. Kelley, 
page 227; Major -John W. Foster, page 232; Colonel Charles Cruft, page 
236; Colonel H. B. Eeed, page 239; Colonel J. A. McHenry, page 241; 
Xiieutenant Cuthbert W. Laing, page 246; Brigadier-General B. M. 
Prentiss, page 279; Lieutenant-Colonel Quin Morton, page 291; Major- 
General Don C. Buell, page 292; Brigadier-General William Nelson, page 
324; Colonel Jacob Ammen, page 334; Colonel William Grose, page 337; 
Lieutenant-Colonel N. L. Anderson, page 339; Colonel Frederick C. Jones, 
page 339; Colonel D. A. Enyart, page 350. 



11 

tion of hostilities at 4 P. M. Sunday, April 6, 1863. I could stop 
here, for these are Official Eoports, puhlished by the government, — 
"Verba volant, scrlpto luanent," — hut other proofs will not only 
uphold these reports, hut show the animus of some persons in mis- 
representing tlie facts of history and the thoughtlessness of others 
in making statements that cannot he corroborated. On both sides, 
South and Xorth, the battle of Shiloh has been persistently misrep- 
resented. Why has this been done? Certainly not through lack of 
proofs of the truth. 

About a quarter of a mile above Pittsburg Landing is Dill 
Branch, which empties at right angle into the Tennessee Eiver. 
The river was very high and there was water to a considerable depth 
in the ravine (General Grant). At the mouth of this creek were 
the gunboats TijJer and Lpxlnr/ion shelling Tip thus ravine. 

General Beauregard had cautioned against the useless exposure of 
the men to their fire. Concerning this caution Colonel Johnston in 
his life of his father, pages 628 and 629, says : ". . . the roar 
and bursting of the shells, however terrific in the rear, at Beaure- 
gard's headquarters, were almost harmless to the troops near the 
river. This Avas one of the lamentable features of the day; that 
what General Beauregard saw at Shiloh Church should be mis- 
taken for the situation at the front ; that the trains of wounded and 
the tide of fugitives should supplant in his eyes those heroic war- 
riors who were still marching forward." In other words. Colonel 
Johnston, who was thousands of miles away from the battle-field, 
would have us believe that he knows better than General Beaure- 
gard, certainly a sujierior authority, Avhat was going on after 6 
P. M. on the'l;attle-field of Shiloh on Sunday, x\pril 6. This is 
absurd. 

Major-General Polk, on page 632 of his report, erroneously says : 
"xA.t this juncture his gunboats dropped down the river near the 
landing, where his troops were collected and opened a tremendous 
cannonade of shot and shell over the bank in the direction where 
our forces were approaching. The height of the plain on which we 
Avere, ahove the level of the water [General Polk did not knoAv the 
river was very high], Avas about 100 feet, so that it was necessary 
to give great elevation to his guns to enable him to fire over the 
bank. The consequence was that shot could take effect only at 
points remote from the river's edge. They were comparatively 
harmless to our troops nearest the bank, and became increasingly so 
as we drew near the enemy and placed him between us and his boats. 
Here the impression arose that our forces Avere waging an unequal 
contest ; that thev were exhausted and suffering from a murderous 



12 

fire; and by an order from the commanding general they were 
withdrawn from the field." 

The report of General Polk was written in September, 1862, 
when he had no access to the reports of others, and therefore he 
was liable to error; bnt Johnston's book was published in 1878. 
when he had full access to all reports on the battle of Shiloh, and 
therefore his misstatements are unpardonable. 

Let us see what the reports say. Brig.-Gen. A. P. Stewart, page 
-t28, says : ''We finally took position, under the orders of General 
Breckinridge, to aid in the pursuit of the enemy, which was checked 
by the fire from the gunboats.", Lieut.-Col. 0. P. Strahl, page 432, 
says : "We then marched forward into line, and continued in line 
until after dark, when Ave fell back, in order to get out of reach of 
the shells from the gunboats." Brig.-Gen. Patton Anderson, page 
499, says : "Soon after halting, several brigades, composing por- 
tions of Generals Polk's and Hardee's commands, filed across the 
road. . . . The enemy's gunboats now opened fire. General 
Ruffoies directed me to move forward a short distance, and h\ 
inclining to the right to gain a little hollow, which would probably 
afford better protection for my men against shells than the posi- 
tion I then occupied. I gained the hollow and called a halt, order- 
ing the men to take cover behind the hill and near a little ravine 
wliich traversed the hollow. We occupied this position some ten or 
fifteen minutes, when one of General Euggies' staff directed me to 
retire to the enemy's camp, beyond the range of his floating guns. 
In filing off from tliis position several men were killed and manv 
wounded by the exploding shells of the enemy. It was now twilight. 
As soon as we had placed a hill between us and the gimboats the 
troops moved slowly." Capt. AV. G. Poole, page 504, says: "My 
command then, with a portion of the brigade, proceeded forward 
as far as Avithin range of the lieavy guns on the Tennessee River, 
where we were for some time exposed to the enemy's shells. One or 
two of my command were eitlier killed or mortally wounded Avhile 
under this fire. We tlien fell hack to the enemy's camp and l)iv- 
ouaeked during the night." 

Col. W. A. Stanley, page 509, says: "We were then ordered tn 
join the command in that direction, which Avas reported to have the 
enemy badly routed and driving them toward their gunboats. After 
proceeding some distance Ave found ourselves in the range of shot 
and shell fired from the boats and vicinity." Col. Marshall J. 
Smith of my regiment, on page 524., says: "After their retreat 
the gunboats opened a most destructive fire, which we endured for 
some time, not being able to reply, and under orders Ave retired in 



13 

good order from the point gained, and took up our quarters for the 
night in one of the enemy's encampments.'^ 

Brigadier-General Chalmers, page 550; Jackson, page 555, and 
S. A. M. Wood, page 593, had ten men killed and many wounded. 
Colonel Patterson, page 599; Maj. John Kelley, page 601, and Col. 
1>. P. Trabue, page 616, lost eleven men and Lieutenant Kellar 
wounded. 

Xow let us examine the Federals' reports. Brig.-Gen. S. A. Hurl- 
hurt, commanding division, page 305, says: "He [Captain Gwin, 
U. S. X.] liad called upon me by one of his officers to mark the 
place tlie gunboats might take to open their fire. . . . He did 
so, and from my own observation and the statement of prisoners his 
fire was most effectual in stopping the advance of the enemy on 
Sunday afternoon and night." Maj. -Gen. D. C. Buell, page 292, 
says : ". . . opened fire on the enemy and repulsed him. The 
action of the gunboats also contributed very much to that result. 
The attack at that point was not renewed, night having come on." 
Lieut. -Col. F. C. Jones, page 339, says: "Having scoured the 
woods for half a mile to the front, . . . and the shells from 
our gunboats falling but a few feet in front of us, we halted. . . .'" 

From such positive statements from officers of high standing in 
both armies, what excuse can Colonel Johnston offer for his er- 
roneous statements concerning the results of the fire of the gun- 
boats? He certainly cannot plead ignorance of these reports. How 
do these facts agree witli the following statement that he quotes 
from General Bragg in support of his thesis, to be read on page 
622 : "Their fire, though terrific in sound and producing some 
consternation at first, did us no damage, as the shells all passed 
over, and exploded far beyond, our position." 

KnoAving who Col. William Preston Johnston was, I am aston- 
ished at the puerility of many of his quotations from the reports, 
which clearly disprove his assertions instead of upholding them. 
And this brings to mind these beautiful words of Bossuet (1627- 
1704), named the Eagle of Meaux on account of his eloquence, 
''Lc plus grand dereglement de Vesprit est de croire les choses, 
parceque Von vent qn/elles soient;' which in plain English is, "The 
greatest disturbance of the mind is to believe things because we 
want them to be." Colonel Johnston wanted his father, though 
dead, to have won the battle of Shiloh; he brooded over it, and, 
with a foregone conclusion, wrote his book and declared, mirahih 
dictu, that had General Beauregard not ordered the retreat, the vic- 
tory won by his father would not have been lost. How could this 
have been the case when his father was killed at 2:30 P. M., after 



14 

which occurrence the hardest fighting of the two days took place at 
■ the Hornets' Xest until 5 :30 P. M., three hours after his father's 
death, Avhen General Prentiss and his 2250 hraves surrendered? 

Up to this time, though we had surprised the enemy and carried 
everything hefore us, it Avas here a nip-and-tuck proposition as to 
whether we would master the position, and it was not until 4 P. M. 
when General Euggles placed all available artillery in position, 
some sixty pieces, and opened fire on the enemy that we suc- 
ceeded in surrounding them and fiffecting their capture ; and 
it was only after this surrender that we could reasonably 
expect to drive General Grant's army into the Tennessee Paver 
or force its capitulation. Having disposed of our prize, we 
proceeded a mile farther toward the river, but alas ! when we 
reached this place it was 6 P. M., after Buell had made his junc- 
tion, as feared by General Beauregard. The position of the enemy 
was a most formidable defensive one, and he in turn had here 
massed all his artillery, besides two gunboats on the river. His line 
ran at right angle to the river, from the bluff a quarter-mile above 
to the Hamburg-Savannah road, half a mile farther west. 

To-day, with my knowledge of the topography of the Shiloh 
battle-field, I can account for the many errors in some reports and 
also for the shortcomings in the Colonel's book. 

CAUSES WHICH LOST THE FRUITS OF THE BATTLE 

When on the 2d of x\pril, 1862, Major-General Polk received at 
about 10 P. M. a telegram from Major-General Cheatham, com- 
manding a division at Bethel, the outpost twenty-four miles from 
Corinth, saying "that a strong body of the enemy, believed to be 
Gen. Lew Wallace's division, was seriously threatening his front," 
General Polk at once sent the dispatch to General Beauregard, who 
immediately, — through the Adjutant General of the Army, General 
(then Colonel) Thomas Jordan, — transmitted the news to Gen- 
eral Johnston, with the endorsement, "N^ow is the time to advance 
and strike the enemy at Pittsburg Landing." 

General Johnston with General Jordan proceeded to General 
Bragg's headquarters, and after a consultation in which General 
Beauregard's suggestion was accepted minute instructions, through 
Special Orders 8, were at once dispatched by couriers to Generals 
Polk and Hardee and by telegraph to General Breckinridge at 
Beirnsville. These instructions were that the next day, April 3, 
the army was to leave Corinth with forty rounds of ammunition 
and three days' cooked rations to each man and proceed with the 
utmost alacrity to Pittsburg Landing, twenty-three miles east of 



15 

Corinth, to attack Gi'ant's army before Buell's arm}' of 25.000 men 
could make a junction. And here comes tlie first cause of failure. 
Alfred Eowan, in "General Beauregard/^ volume I, page 275, 
says : "The march, nevertheless, did not begin at the time directed, 
chiefly througli the misapprehension of the commander of the 
1st Corps, General Polk, who, instead of moving forward upon the 
full verbal instructions he had received, held his corps under arms, 
and with its trains blocked the way of the other troops . 
but it was already dark before the rear of its column filed out of 
Corinth." The second cause of failure was the most unfortunate 
delay on the morning of the 5th, which prevented the battle from 
commencing on that day at 8 A. M., as intended by General John- 
ston. 

In "The Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston" we read on 
page 563 : "All this was to be done by 7 A. M. on the 5th and the 
battle to begin at 8." In a little while Bragg's right wing, un- 
der Withers, deployed into line, but 8 o'clock came, and then 9^ 
and still the division on his left was nowhere to be seen. About 
9 :30 General Johnston sent me to General Bragg to know "why the 
column on his left was not in position." Bragg' replied : "Tell 
General Johnston the head of that column has not made its ap- 
rance. I have sent to the rear for information, and as soon as 

fearn the cause of its detention he shall be informed." 10, 11, 
and 11 :30 o'clock came., and General Johnston began to show signs 
of impatience. I was again sent back to know of Bragg "why the 
column on his left was not yet in position." At length 13 :30 
o'clock came, and still there was no appearance of the missing col- 
umn nor any report from Bragg. General Johnston, looking at his 
watch, then glancing at the position of the sun, exclaimed : "This is 
perfectly puerile ! This is not tvar! Let us have our horses." 

He, Maj. Albert Smith, Capt. N'athaniel Wickliffe, and I rode 
to the rear until we found the missing column standing stock-still, 
with its head some distance out in an open field. It was about 4. 
o'clock when the lines were completely formed, — too late, of course, 
to begin the battle there." Had Bragg l)een in the rear attending to 
his corps, this would not have happened ; the battle would have been 
fought on Saturday the 5th with different results. And Lee would 
have had different results at Gettysburg had Longstreet, as ordered, 
attacked at 9 A. M. instead of 3 P. M. 

We fought the battle of Shiloh with an army of men the ma- 
jority of whom were fresh from mercantile houses and the pur- 
suits of a peaceful life, fagged out by a. three days' march over very 
rough roads that were rendered almost impassable by the rain; our 



peai'J 
I Tea 



16 

officers Avere insufficient in numbers, and were inefficient because 
of their ignorance of the tactics of war. In addition to these dis- 
advantages our three days' supply of cooked rations was exhausted, 
and we feared a junction of Grant's forces with Buell's. 

Buell did make his junction with Grant, as was feared by General 
Beauregard, at 5 P. M. on the first day, two hours, more or less, be- 
fore cessation of hostilities, when Ammen's brigade fell in line on 
the river bluff on the left of the siege guns. Here Chalmers' and 
Jackson's and Trabue's brigades and the 1st Mississippi Cavalry 
under Colonel Lindsay moved into the valley of Dill Branch and at- 
tempted to displace them; but the exhausted condition of our men, 
our lack of ammunition, the topography of the grounds, and the 
position of the gunboats proved insurmountable obstacles; and the 
attempt failed. 

The "famous council of war" of which Colonel Johnston writes 
on page 566, whether intentional or casual, was a "pause at the 
Eubicon." 

The third cause of failure was the unnecessary exposure of the 
general in chief, resulting in his death, and the most unfortunate 
loss of time that brought us on the river bluff after the arrival of 
Ammen's brigade of Buell's army had saved Grant's army from 
annihilation or capture. In all these three causes the loss of time 
Avas the loss of the fruits of victory. 

General Albert Sidney Johnston. 

True type of the Southern gentleman, noble Christian, brave, 
honest, dutiful to the marrow of his bones, Gen. Albert Sidney 
Johnston had been most severely and at times unjustly criticized 
for reverses that were not always under his control. "The test of 
merit in my profession with the people is success. It is a hard rule, 
but I think it right." These few words, — ending his letter of 
March 18, 1863, to Mr. Davis, — and liis offer to turn over to Gen- 
eral Beauregard the command of the army bear testimony to the 
magnificent patriotism of the man and his veneration for the 
opinion of his countrymen. As he was sensitive and his feelings 
had been wounded by criticism, we can account for his presence 
at the liead of a charging brigade where he received his mortal 
wound, instead of being Avhere he should have been, — in the rear of 
his army. On this occasion, however, he had with him General 
Beauregard, in Avhom, unlike his son, he had implicit confidence. 

All reports agree that the death of the commanding general 
caused a loss of from two to three hours at the most critical mo- 
ment of the engagement. If Colonel Johnston had said, "Until 



17 

the death of my father the battle was a great success, and had he 
not been killed everything indicated the total annihilation of 
Grant's army/' he would have said what no one could disprove 
with any certified proofs, but to try to put the blame on General 
Beauregard is 

An Ignis Fatuus that bewitches 
And leads men in pools and ditches. 

The death of General Johnston, with the disastrous loss of time 
that it caused, shows how improper, — aye, how vilainous and cow- 
ardly, — it is to criticize unjustly or too severely one who, despite 
the best of intentions, has failed. The press had most severely 
and at times unjustly criticized General Johnston. How can peo- 
ple who talk a great deal and write a great deal, but never fight, 
criticize an army in the field? All honor to Gen. Albert Sidney 
Johnston. Peace to his ashes. 

Geneeal Bragg. 

General Bragg was placed by GPl-esident Davis in command of 
the forces at Tupelo on July 20, 1862, after he had in an undigni- 
fied manner relieved General Beauregard of that command, — the 
Army of the Mississippi. Let us see what were the motives of 
the President or the merits of General Bragg that he should have 
been chosen by Mr. Davis. First, as I have stated before, tlie 
battle of Shiloli should have been, and would have been, fought 
on Saturday the 5tli instead of on Sunday, had General Bragg 
managed his corps as General Hardee managed his and been in 
his place, second line of battle, 800 feet behind this one at 8 A. M. 
Let us not forget the words of General Johnston at 12 :30 P. M. 
when he was annoyed at the absence of General Bragg: "This 
is perfectly puerile. This is not war ! Let us have our horses." 
Second, that General Bragg in a contingency on the field might 
give orders in the name of the general-in-chief, or the second in 
command, he was made chief of the General Staff. See "General 
Beauregard," by Alfred Eoman, volume I, page 268. He was on 
the field in front near where General Johnston was killed; then 
why was there the loss of time, some two or three hours, after the 
fall of the General, when he was authorized to act in his name ? 

General Bragg, according to his report, had been driven back in 
all his attacks, from 10:30 A. M. to 3 P. M., in attempting to 
break and repulse the Union line confronting the Confederate 
"right center." Four times he sent Gibson's Louisiana brigade 
to the attack, to be murderously repulsed. Why did he not, — ' 



13 

at least after the second repulse, — do what General Knggles did 
at 4 P. M., — that is, mass his artillery and open fire on Generals 
Wallace and Prentiss ? And, to cap the climax, he censured Colonel 
Gibson, who after the battle asked for a court of inquiry. We see 
the same occurrence after the battle of Chickamauga when General 
Bragg after his neglect to enter Chattanooga and capture Eose- 
crans' army placed Lieutenant-Generals Polk and D. H. Hill and 
Major-General Hindman under arrest. Was this one of his foibles, 
or was it due to that terrible irritation, his chronic dyspepsia? He 
was neither the best nor the senior officer after General Beauregard ;, 
yet Mr. Davis chose him to replace Beauregard. Mens sana in cor- 
pore sano would have helped Mr. Davis in choosing his generals; 
Init it was not always so. Eeader, you will find important his- 
torical data in the interesting polemics in the New Orleans Picayune 
of April 5, 17, 23 and 34, 1887 ; of May 6, 10 and 22, 1887 ; of June 
26, 1887; of August 31, 1902, and in the articles in Dr. Y. E. Le- 
Monnier's "Military Scrap Book," volume I, pages 8 to 29, by Gen- 
erals Beauregard, Jordan and Wheeler, and by Messrs: Jefferson 
Davis, William Preston Johnston, and K. E. Chisolm. 

GE>rERAL Polk. 

Major-General Polk, senior in command after General Beaure- 
gard, says in his report in Behel Record, page 410 : "Colonel Miller 
dashed forward, intercepted within 150 yards of the river the 

Second Michigan and captured it A portion of this 

cavalry rode to the river and watered their horses." 

This is an error, and must be corrected, for if we captured that 
battery that near to the Tennessee Eiver and the cavalry there 
watered their horses, this question arises : What became of the 
enemy's last stand, with its massed artillery, siege and field, on the 
river bulff, and where were the gunboats, that they should have 
allowed the cavalry to water their horses in the stream ? Of course, 
we did not know the topography of the ground in the rear of the 
enemy. Eoss' Second Michigan Battery was captured near Hurl- 
but's headquarters, three-qiiarters of a mile from the river, as it 
was leaving this place to post itself in line with the other artil- 
lery at the bluff on the rived bank, while the cavalry watered their 
horses at Dill Branch, nearly or fully half a mile from the Ten- 
nessee Eiver. 

The General again errs when he says : "We had one hour or 
more of daylight still left; were within 150 to 400 yards of the 
enemy's position, and nothing seemed Avanting to complete the 



19 

most brilliant victory of the war bnt to press forward and make a 
vigorous assault on the demoralized remnant of his forces,"' 

In W. M. Polk's "Leonidas Polk, Bishop and General," volume 
II, page 109, the General, in a letter to his wife, dated April 10, 
1862, writes: "The enemy was badly whipped the first day, and 
we ought, from the advantage gained, to have captured his whole 
force. We would have done so if we had had an hour more of day- 
light." General Polk here speaks of what happened, after the 
capture of General Prentiss and his 2,250 men, in the Hornets' 
ISTest. This capture took place at 5:30 or later; sun sets on that 
date, April 6, at 6 :10. If it took less than thirty minutes for these 
2,250 men to stack their arms and be on their march to the rear, 
it is marvelous. The lay of the land has not changed, and the 
beautiful maps of the topography of the Shiloh National Military 
Park of to-day show us that the Hornets' Nest is nearly one and 
a half miles from the river, which is correct. I have walked it. 
Therefore, the General was more than six times farther from the 
river, nor did we have over half an hour of daylight, if that much. 
Of these assertions I am positive ; five minutes of reflection will 
show their correctness. General Beauregard is right when he says : 
"It was after 6 o'clock when the enemy's last position was car- 
ried. . . . Darkness was close at hand." All reports agree 
with General Beauregard in these statements. 

General Hardee. 

Major-General Hardee, commanding the Third Corps, loco citato, 
page 569, writes : "Nothing could be more brilliant than the attack. 
The fierce volleys of 100,000 muskets and the boom of 200 cannons, 
receding steadily toward the river, marked, hour by hour, from 
dawn until night, our slow but ceaseless advance. ... At 
this moment of supreme interest it was our misfortune to lose the 
Commanding General, who fell, mortally wounded, at 2 :30 o'clock. 
This disaster caused a lull in the attack on the right, 
and precious hours were wasted. It is, in my opinion, the candid 
belief of intelligent men that but for this calamity we would have 
achieved before sunset a triumph signal not only in the annals 
of this war, but memorable in future history." He falls into the 
same error that is found in the other reports when he says : "Upon 
the death of General Johnston, the command having devolved upon 
General Beauregard, the conflict was continued until near sunset, 
and the advance divisions were within a feV hundred yards of 
Pittsburg, . . . when the order to withdraw was received." 
We were half a mile from it. 



20 



Prksident Jeffebsox Davjs. 

It is very, very miich to be regretted that a man like Mr. Davis, 
occupying such an exalted position, President of the Confederate 
States, should have had a mind so contracted, so limited, as to 
allow his feelings, pi'O or con, to dictate to his conscience. And 
this brings back to memory the following incident that took place 
at Corinth: My company, Company B of the Crescent Eegiment, 
liad for its second junior Lieutenant W. F. Howell, a brother-in- 
law of Jefferson Davis. One evening some of us Avere standing, 
some were seated on the grass; in the center, seated on a stump, 
was Lieutenant Howell. We began to discuss Jefferson Davis, and 
the Lieutenant remarked that he was a man of great likes and dis- 
likes, and that his decisions were controlled by his feelings. There 
^-as a general expression of disapproval. The Lieutenant then 
Temarked : "Stop, gentlemen ; let me take back what I have said ; 
wait and judge for yourselves; but remember — I am Jefferson 
Davis' brother-in-law, and I know the man." Silence followed. 

Well, I have waited and judged for myself, and so have others; 
iind unfortunately the assertion of Lieutenant Howell was but too 
correct. But, too painful are the instances when Mr. Davis acted, 
not from equity and justice^ but according to his feelings. I should 
prefer to say nothing about Mr. Davis, but he, unfortunately, like 
his factotum. Colonel William Preston Johnston, of his staff, has 
written some things that are incorrect, and written words endure. 
Therefore, when they are erroneous, if they are not corrected, they 
stand in bold relief in the place of the truth of history. Amiens 
.Plato, seel magis amica Veritas historicc. ]\Ir. Davis in his mag- 
nificent "Eise and Fall of the Confederate Government,'' a work 
destined to be found in all well stocked lil)rarics, a Avork withoiit 
which the student of the history of our country Is at sea, has 
unfortunately written in Chapter VIII, of volume II, a scathing 
criticism of General Beauregard. In this criticism he repeats 
the assertions of Colonel Johnston that I have already referred to, 
and therefore I cannot allow it to pass by in silence. ]\fany of tlie 
errors therein contained I have already corrected in the pages of 
this article. I will say of the letter of General Gilmore, chief 
engineer of the Confederate States Army, to Colonel William P. 
Johnston, dated September 17, 1872, loco citato, page 63. what Mr. 
Davis says of General Beauregard's report on page 61. Take the 
"If" out of General Gilmore's letter, — "If your father had sur- 
vived the day." This letter reminds me of the statements of Colonel 
Lockett, General Bragg's engineer, — statements that I have already 



21 

quoted, — and how singular are the following words of General 
Bragg's report, on page 65 of Mr. Da^is' booky "Just at this time 
an order was received from the commanding general to withdraw 
the forces beyond the enemy's lire." I refer you to the remark 
already quoted of General Bragg to General Beauregard at Sliiloh 
Church, as reported ])y Colonel Chisolm. 

The Federal Colonel Worthington, of the 4Gth Ohio, on page 60, 
asserts: "About 3 P. M. all communications with the river (land- 
ing) ceased About 2 P. M. the whole Union right. . . . was 

driven back in disorder and the Confederate flanking force cut the 
center off from the landing soon after General Johnston's fall."' 
This is most uaccountably erroneous. Had we succeeded in reach- 
ing the river, our goal, Buell, never would have miade that jimction, 
which was something to be feared by us. Prentiss saved Grant 
from annihilation and capture by his stubborn resistance at the 
Hornets' Nest ; when Hurlbut saw that we were surrounding them 
he slipped out and proceeded to the siege guns on the river bank, 
where Ammcn's brigade of Buell's army was then falling in line. 
It was in attempting to slip out also that the Federal Maj.-Gen. 
AV. H. L. Wallace, on Prentiss' right, fell; he died three days later. 
I am astonished that Mr. Davis should have inserted such a state- 
ment in his work, for he was too intelligent a man not to have 
known that, had we succeeded in obtaining possession of that river 
bank, Grant's arni}^ was our prize, and that Buell could not have 
made his junction, — in fact, that he never would have attempted 
to cross that deep and large river. Colonels Geddes and Worthing- 
ton are the only ones to make such a statement. Mr. Davis has 
here fallen into the same error that his staff officer fell into. '"Who 
wants to prove too Tntich proves nothing." 

The narrative continues : "General Beauregard had told General 
Johnston that morning as he rode off that if it should be necessary 
to comm.unicate wilh him or for him to do anything, he would be 
found in Iris amhiilance in hcd:'' The italics are mine. I do not 
imderstand how Mr. Davis, a man of fine intellect, instruction, and 
erudition, coidd have allowed his dislike to General Beauregard so 
to enslave him as to! repeat in his book this most ridiculous asser- 
tion. I could dispense with saying a word on this subject, so welt 
is tiie assertion disproved in "General Beauregard," by Alfred Po- 
man, volume I, page 3J-8, but as I am one of the few remaining- 
soldiers who saw and spoke to. — counting the cheering by a soldier 
of his chief as having spoken to him, — General Beauregard on Sun- 
day, April G, 18G?. I liere enter my most solemn protest against 
such a shamefnl assertion. 



22 

At 2 P. M. on Simclav my regiment, the Crescent, was shifted 
from Owl Creek Bridge on the extreme left to the Hornets' Xest. 
On our Avay we saw General Beauregard; he was on a stnmp. his 
kepi in his left hand, his right extended toward the river, and he 
commanded us, "Go; drive the enemy into the river." So great 
was our joy on seeing this great Louisianian before our eyes that 
lOur shouts and hurrahs attracted the attention of the unseen enemy, 
who, firing in our direcition, exploded one or two shells very near us; 
and this had the effect of hastening our arrival at the Hornets' 
Nest. He looked then like anything hut a sick man. But Mr. 
Davis had a spite against General Beauregard. I never knew Avhy; 
does any one know? But General Bragg was one of his pets. 

Mr. Davis endsi his cha])ter hy several comparisons which, to me, 
seem more or less incongruous. First, the comparison to Turenne 
is admirably answered in volume I, page 341, of "General Beaure- 
gard," by Alfred Eoman. Second, "Had the attack been vigorously 
pressed...." Had General Bragg, who was in the front on the 
left of General Johnston when he was killed, vigorously ]>ressecl the 
attack as Mr. Davis, then in Richmond, says should have been done, 
perhaps Mr. Davis' wishes would have been fulfilled. General Bragg 
had been made the chief-of-tlie-staff of the army for just such an 
emergency. 

Third. "Grant's army being beaten, the next step of General 
Johnston's programme. ..." I do not pose as a competent judge, 
nor do I approve or disapprove, of the management of our troops 
hy General Johnston prior to tlie Shiloh campaign ; Init does it not 
look risky for the President, with the past of yesterday l)efore his 
eyes, to augur so prosperously for the morrow? Be this as it may. 
the predictions of Mr. Davis, — like those of his staff officer. Colonel 
Johnston, — fall flat, for they have proved nothing., while their asser- 
tion that General Beaiiregard lost the fruits of a victory won by 
General Johnston is disproved by the facts. Whatever happened, 
happened Deo volente. 

Gexeral Grant. 

In "Battles and Leaders." volume T, page 465, General Grant 
writes of Dill Branch and tlie Tennessee Eiver ; "There was, I have 
said, a deep ravine in front of our left. The Tennessee Elver was 
very high, and there was Avater to a considerable depth in tbe 
ravine. Here the enemy made a last desperate effort to turn (uir 
flank, but waS; repelled. Tlie gunboats Tyler and Le.vinr/Uw. Gwin 
and Sbirk connnanding, with the artillery under Webster, aided the 
army and effectually checked their further progress. 



23 

General Buell. 

In "Battles and Leaders," vohime I, page 506, General Buell 

writes: " and one by one with Prentiss, between 5:30 and 6 

o'clock, they were forced to surrender. This gallant resistance and 
the delay caused by the necessary disposition of the captives weak- 
ened the force of the attacdv which McClernand sustained in his 
seventh position on the river road at 4 o'clock, and retarded the 
onward movement of the enemy three hours . . . . " On the same 
page we read: "In his report of April 9th, to General Halleck, 
General Grant says : ^At a late hour in the afternoon a desperate 
effort was made by the enemy to turn out left and get possession 
of tlie landing, transports, etc. This point was guarded by the gun- 
boats Tyler and Lexington, Captains Gwin and Shirk, IT. S. N., 
commanding, four twenty-pounder Parrott gims and a battery of 
rifled guns. As there is a deep and impassable ravine for artillery 
and cavalry and very difficult for infantry at this point, no troops 
were stationed there, except the necessary artilleries and a small 
infantry force for their support. Just at this moment the advance 
of Major-General Buell's column (a part of the division under 
General Nelson) arrived, the two generals named both being pres- 
ent. An advance was immediately made upon the point of attack 
and the enemy so(^i driven back. In this repulse much is due to 
the presence of the gunlioats Tyler and Lexington . . . .' " 

Continuing, General Buell adds, on page 507 : " 'My own official 
report is to the same effect,' General Hurlbut said. After 6 P. M. 
tliis movement (for a final attack at tlie landing) was reported to 
General Hurlbut. He at once took measures to change the front 
of twO' regiments, or parts of regim'ents, of which the 55tli Illinois 
was one, and to turn six pieces of artillery to bear upon the point 
of danger. At that instant, he being near the head of the Landing 
road. General Grant came up from the river, closely followed by 
Ammen's brigade of jSTelson's division. Information of the ex- 
pected attack was promptly given, and two of Ammen's regiments 
deployed into line, moved rapidly forward, and after a few sharp 
exchanges of volleys from them, the enemy fell back and the bloody 
series of engagements of Sunday at Pittsburg Landing closed with 
tliat last repulse." 

Do these preceding lines, coming from disinterested enemies, in- 
dicate on the part of the Confederates a retreat at or about 4 P. M. ? 
Do they not confirm the report of General Beauregard that "it was 
after 6 P. M., as before said, when the enemy's last position was 



24 

carried""? Do they not uphold the reasonableness of his fear lest 
Buell should make his junction with Grant? Was not Prentiss 
right when he said, "To-morrow Bnell will change the tide of 
events" ? Did not the enemy know better than we did the state of 
things in their rear,— that is, that the river was very high (not a 
hundred feet below the surface) and the valley of Dill Branch very 
■deep, thereby rendering very valuable and effective the shells of their 
gimboats at its mouth ? Does this condition of things warrant the 
assertion, "One more charge, my men, and we shall capture them 
all" ? Now that we know these facts we account for the failure of 
Chalmers, Anderson, and others in their last stand on the river 
bluff. How could men, exhausted and in dislocated commands, 
overcome splendidly armed fresh troops on such a lay of ground, 
no matter how determined they may have been? On this bluff 
were Ammen's brigade of fresh troops, Hurlbut's division, and what 
was left of W. H. L. Wallace's division, under McArthur. 

These few lines alone from such high authorities as Generals 
Grant, Buell, and Hurlbut., of the Federal Army, should be suffi- 
cient to silence ever more such diatribes as have been attempted in 
order to blacken the way General Beauregard maneuvered the enemy- 
out of position after the fall of General Johnston. 

Gexeral Beauregard, 

Towarcl the end of January, 1863, after the defeat and death of 
General Zollicoffer at Mill Spring, in Kentucky, General Beaure- 
gard received a visit at his headquarters, at Centerville, Va., from 
Colonel Eoger A. Pryor. of Virginia, a member of the Military 
Committee of the Confederate Congress, informing the general that 
he had been deputed by his committee and the representatives in 
Congress from the ]\Iississippi A^alley States generally to urge him 
to consent to his transfer to the Mississippi Valley, as great fears 
were expressed about its safety. Colonel Pryor said that President 
Davis would gladlv order the transfer, should the general consent. 

General Beauregard at first declined, but after a statement from 
the Acting Secretary of War, Mr. Benjamin, that the effective force 
in General Johnston's department fully numbered 70.000 men, — ^ 
40,000 under General Johnston, 30,000 imder General Polk,— he 
decided to go, but on the three following conditions: First, that 
the force in tlie department should be as represented, or if not, 
would be reinforced to that number; second, that he should take 
Avith him his personal and general staff, and. if needed, ten or 
twelve experienced officers from the Anny of the Potomac, — none 



25 

above the rank of colonel, some to be promoted to brigadiers, others 
to major-generals, so as to facilitate his organizing an army, — and, 
third, that he should return to the command of his army in Vir- 
ginia. 

He reached Bowling Green, Ivy., on February 4th, and there met 
for the first time General Albert Sidney Johnston, and learned that, 
while the enemy was supposed to have about 130,000 men. General 
Johnston had only 45,000 of all arms and conditions, and that these 
45,000 were badly armed. In other words, the situation was any- 
thing but cheerful. General Johnston, too, was equally surprised 
and chagrined to learn from General Beauregard that the War De- 
partment was ignorant of his forces. General Beauregard expressed 
the desire to return to A'irginia, but, through deference for General 
Johnston and the plight he was in, he consented to remain and help 
him all he could, even offering to remain as his chief engineer and 
inspector-general. This offer General Johnston declined, and he 
himself even offered later to turn over the command of the army to 
General Beauregard, while he, Johnston, retained command of the 
department. Disasters followed upon disasters: Bowling Green, 
Columbus, Ivy., and Nashville, Tenn., were evacuated; Ports Henry 
and Donelson, with about 10,000 men, surrendered. General John- 
ston had informed General Beauregard that he could procure no 
more troops from the Confederate and State Governments. 

In the meantime General Beauregard, in spite of his ailment, had 
been very active in levying and assembling troops by sending a con- 
fidential circular by special messengers to the governors of Alabama, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee, asking for five or ten thou- 
sand men equipped, as best they could, for sixty or ninety days ; to 
General Bragg at Penacola, Lovell at "New Orleans, and Van Dorn 
at Pocahontas. Ark., to come with whatever troops they could in all 
possible haste to stated places, with Corinth, Miss., the objective 
point. He asked that all troops come with three days' cooked rations 
and forty rounds of ammunition to each man. 

Strange to say, the War Department did not approve of this call 
on the governors of the States for sixty or ninety days' troops, 
ol)jecting that there was no law authorizing such a levy and affecting 
to igTiore the old adage Inter arma silent leges. All the governors 
and generals answered with alacrity except Van Dorn, who was en- 
gaged with a movement that culminated with the battle of Elkhorn. 

Prior to leaving his Virginia army to go to the West, General 
Beauregard had imposed three conditions, his sme c/ua non. One 
of these was that ten or twelve officers, none above the rank of 



26 

colonel, but subject to promotion, should be sent to him if called for. 
These officers were to be men of experience, and it was absolutely 
necessary for him to have them to command in a new army about 
to take the field. The time had come when their services were 
needed; troops were coming in freely, the movements of the enemy 
indicated the necessity of an immediate action on our part, and 
our army was not yet organized. In "General Beauregard," by 
Alfred Boman, volume I, page 251, we read : "On the 4th of March 
General Beauregard therefore again urgently asked for two major- 
generals and five brigadiers, — one of the latter to serve with the 
cavalry, — and all to be ordered to report immediately to him. To 
his great surprise — and gTeater disappointment — the War Depart- 
ment replied that these officers could not be spared Here was 

an incongruous army, concentrated under the greatest difficulties 
imaginable, ready for any sacrifice, eager to meet the enemy, but 
whose organization and effectiveness were fearfully impaired by 
the absolute want of general officers to enforce discipline and estab- 
lish harmony between its several parts." 

General Beauregard threatened to resign; on the 11th the War 
Department telegraphed that four generals were on their way to 
him. Just before the battle of Shiloh he wired to the authorities 
at Richmond, loco citato, page 253, "that he had called for ten 
generals, as absolutely indispensable to the efficiency of his forces; 
that out of the four granted him two only were present for duty; 
and that. . . .he would not hold himself responsible for the conse- 
quences that might ensue. He appealed at thel same time to some 
leading members of Congress ; . . . . but this was of no effect. The 
course of the War Department resulted disastrously, as General 
Beauregard had apprehended." This disastrous result was caused by 
Mr. Davis' narrow-mindedness because of his spite against General 
Beauregard. This want of general officers is mentioned in some of 
the reports. In General Bragg-'s report we read, "The want of 
proper organization and discipline, and the inferiority in many 
cases of our officers to the men they were expected to command, left 
us often without system or order. ..." The first meeting of Gene- 
rals Johnston and Beauregard, in face of the pending calamities, 
was most pathetic, most patriotic. Pro hono puhlico would that 
our high officials during these four years that tried man's souls had 
always so acted ! 

In the latter days of March General Johnston made his junction 
with General Beauregard at Corinth, with some 13,000 men. These 
men,, together with those that General Beauregard had gathered 



27 

from all possible sources, Made, — on the 2d of April, when that 
telegram was received from Cheatham at 10 P. M., — an army of 
some 40,000 men, and enabled Generals Johnston and Beanregard 
to advance on Grant at Pittsburg Landing with 35,953 infantry 
and artillery, plus 4,383 cavalry, of which two-thirds were useless, 
or with 40,335 against 66,812 in Grant's and BuelFs armies. 

With this number we left our camps at Corinth on Thursday, 
April 3, 1862, to attack the enemy at Pittsburg Landing, twenty- 
three miles distant, where, on Sunday morning at 4:55 the Con- 
federate, Major Hardcastle's pickets in the Fraley field, three miles 
from the landing, struck the Federal, Major Powell's pickets, and 
tlie battle was opened. There is no doubt that the enemy were sur- 
prised; that they were has been admitted directly by the Federal 
Generals Prentiss and Lew Wallace and indirectly through Federal 
reports and writings. In "Indiana at Shiloh," Report of the Com- 
mission, by John W. Coons, 44th Infantry, page 73, we read: "A 
picket line was established and the 44th was one of the first regi- 
ments on the picket line on the great battle-field of Shiloh, which 
was three weeks before the battle took place .... At 6 :30 o'clock 
Sunday morning, April 6, 1862, the booming of cannon and roar 
of musketry began without any warning whatever in front and on 
the extreme left. ... In the midst of excitement and the beating 
of the long roll it was moved forward to the attack, and on its 
advance was met by a large body of fleeing and panic-stricken men. 
Guns, knapsacks, and blankets were strewn everywhere. An entire 
division was seen scattered and retreating, which looked as though 
the whole Union army had been surprised. The enemy at this 
time was already a mile within the Federal army camps." 

Our men fought beautifully and slowly, but surely carried every- 
thing before them, capturing camp after camp. Here we met our 
worst stumbling-block, the lavish wealth of the enemy's camp and 
the lack of proper officers to keep our commands together ; and here 
straggling commenced. Ah, Mr. Davis, why did you not send the 
officers asked for by General Beauregard ! This straggling had com- 
menced before General Johnston fell, as may be seen from the fol- 
lowing lines in the book of his son, page 612 : "In his right hand 
he held a tin cup .... As they were passing through a captured 
camp, an officer had brought from a tent a number of valuable 
articles, calling General Johnston's attention to them. He answered 
with some sternness: 'None of that, sir; we are not here for 
plunder!' And then, as if regretting) the sharpness of the rebuke, 
he added, taking this little tin cup, 'Let this be my share of 



28 

the spoils to-day."" And let lis read in General Brass's report: 

" and the large proportion of stragglers .... Especially was 

this the case after the occupation of the enemy's camps, the spoils of 
which served to delay and generally to demoralize our men." 

When Mark Anthony, the representative of Cffisar, summoned 
the beautiful and fascinating Cleopatra, the richest, most remark- 
able woman of the age, Queen of Eygpt, to surrender, how did she 
answer the summons? With money, ornaments, and gifts she came 
to the Cydmus. and ascended the river in a magniiicent barge, pre- 
pared to meet her judge, not as a criminal, but as a conqueror. On 
her arrival she invited him on her barge, where a banquet, resplen- 
dent with its munifioence and wealth, awaited him. He accepted, 
et cie facto was her prisoner. At the battle of Shiloh human nature 
had not changed since the days of the Csesars and Cleopatras. 
However well-to-do one is, there is that morbid curiosity that bids 
him stop, look, and reflect at the sight of a lavishness of wealth. 
It was this curiosity that held so many of our men in these cap- 
tured camps, not the desire of plunder, for, to the manner born, we 
had enjoj^ed better at home from our birth ; morbid curiosity, how- 
ever, caused many of us, not yet soldiers curbed down to military 
obedience, to stop and become stragglers nnintentionall)', instead of 
chargers in front driving without respite the enemy into the river. 
Two years later such straggling would have been unknown in either 
army. 

From the time we captured tlie second and certainly the third 
camp our arriiy was in a state of dislocation. Many of our men who 
but a fortnight previous had been seated at the family table, with 
their loved ones around them, and who had never handled nor fired 
a gim, thought that not only the battle was over, but even the Avar, 
— that the enemy had run away and given up the ghost. 

And now comes the great responsibility of the War Department 
in not furnishing to General Beauregard the twelve, — only twelve, 
just think, — officers he had urged on that department as being ab- 
solutely necessary in an army of raw recruits. These officers would 
have been at this critical moment better than that many thousands 
of raw troops, for they would have kept the commands together, 
each one in its place; instead there were colonels leading companies, 
brigadiers leading regiments, and the commander-in-chief himself 
leading a l:)rigade, to be slain at the most critical moment of the 
contest. General Johnston had no business in the front line lead- 
ing a l)rigade; his place was in the rear; he was mortified at the 
ignorance, if not neglect, of the War Department with respect to 



the condition of his army. Had that department transferred to 
his command the experienced officers General Beauregard had asl^ed 
for and had shown to be absolutely necessary, General Johnston 
wonld not have exposed himself imnecessarily, desultory charges 
would have given place to well made and sustained attacks, disloca- 
tions of comTnand would not have occurred. Indeed, there is every 
reason to believe tliat instead of the death of the general-in-chief 
in the Peach Orchard at 2 :30 P. M. he might have found himself 
on the banks of the Tennessee, had the War Department done its 
duty. Then Mr. Davis would have been spared the injustice, — may 
I be allowed to say the puerility? — of publishing word for word in 
chapter 8, volume II, of his book the attack on General Beauregard 
that was made by his staff officer, Colonel William P. Johnston. 
Their assertions they have never proved, but these same assertions 
are here disproved by the 229 official Confederate and Federal re- 
ports of the battle, and also by other proofs that have been obtained 
since the war. 

Colonel William Preston Johnston. 

The last chapter of Colonel Johnston's book, "A Son's Estimate." 
is a beautiful one, bringing forth noble sentiments, — sentiments 
that always command respect. How can one write such beautiful 
lines to a father's memory while hypercriticizing the father of his 
neighbor? Is a man great and good only in the eyes of his chil- 
dren? Surely the colonel has forgotten liis own citation, — that is, 

" 'Tis only the actions of the just 

Smell sweet and blossom in the dust." 

But hush ! silence is more eloquent than speech. 
Our Heroes. 

The noble patriots mentioned in these pages have all been ferried 
over by Charon. Their deeds remain to be studied, pondered over, 
by the honest student of history, each to decide for himself, accord- 
ing to how he sees and understands them. May their patriotism 
be the incentive to coming generations. Requiescant in Pace. 

. Topography. 

The battle of Shiloh was fought on a triangular piece of ground, 
— bounded by the Tennessee River on the east. Lick Creek on the 
south. Owl and Snake Creeks on the north, — with a frontage of 
three miles at its base on the river; its sides somewhat more, with 
an opening, at its apex tfie west, of one mile more or less, through 



30 

which we entered our trysting-place. This isosceles is situated 
twenty-three miles northeast of Corinth. Miss., in the State of 
Tennessee and is known as Pittsburg Landing, on the Tennessee 
Kiver, a large, deep stream, navigable to steamboats the year round. 
This triangle was an A No. 1 location for a camp, within proximity 
of an enemy, havirig its three sides protected by water courses, with 
its apex as the heel of Achilles. 

Tn "Battle of Shiloh," by Major D. W. Eeed. page 9, we read: 

"Pittsburg Landing, on the left bank of the Tennessee Pdver, 
eight miles above Savannah, was at that time simply a landing 
place for steamboats trading along the river. Its high blufp, at 
least eighty feet above the water at its highest flood, afforded a 
safe place for the deposits of products unloaded from, or to be 
loaded upon, the boats. From this landing a good ridge road ran 
southwesterly to Corinth. Miss., twentj^-two miles away. One mile 
out from the river the Corinth road crossed another road running 
north and south parallel with the river, and connecting Savannah 
below with Hamburg, four miles above Pittsburg Landing. One- 
quarter of a mile byond this crossing, the Corinth road forked, the 
part known as Eastern Corinth road running nearly south imtil it 
intersected thei Bark road, three miles from the river. 

The other, or main road, running due west from the fork, crossed 
the Hamburg and Purdy road two miles from the river, and then 
turning southwest, passed Shiloh, Church just two and a half miles 
from the river. At a point five miles out this main road intersected 
the Bark road at the southwest corner of what is now the lands of 
the Shiloh National Military Park. The Bark road, running nearly 
due east to Hamburg, forms the southern Ijoundary of the park. 

"On the south side of the Bark road ridge is Lick Creek, which 
has its rise near Monterey, and empties into the Tennessee about 
two miles above the Pittsburg Landing. North of the main Corinth 
road, and at an average of about one mile from it, is Owl Creek, 
which flows northeasterly and empties into Snake Creek at the point 
where the Savannah road crosses it. Snake Creek empties into the 
Tennessee River about one mile l^elow Pittsburg Landing. 

"All these streams flow through flat, muddy Ijottom lands and 
are, in the spring of the year, practically impassable, and in April, 
18 G2, could not be crossed except at two or three places where 
bridges were maintained. These streams therefore formed an ex- 
cellent protection against an attack upon either flank of an army 
camped between them. The general surface of the land along the 
Corinth road is about on the same level, but is cut up on either side 



31 

by deep ravines and water courses leading into the creeks. In 
many of these ravines are running streams with the usual marshy 
margins. 

"In 1863 this plateau was covered with open forest with frequent 
thick imdergrowth and an occasional clearing of a few acres sur- 
rounding the farmhouse of the owmer." 

The lay of the land is more or less irregular, with ravines deep 
enough to protect horses and even ordnance^wagons from the pass- 
ing missiles. About the center is a ridge, the main road, with a 
watershed to the south into Lick Creek and to the north into Owl 
and Snake Creeks. So rank was the imdergrowth and low the limbs 
of the trees that the cavalry was useless. 

At a quarter mile above the landing, between it and the mouth 
of Lick Creek, is Dill Branch, in a deep ravine with swampy mar- 
gins and very steep banks to the ridge above, emptying into the 
Tennessee Eiver. It was at the mouth of Dill Branch that the 
gimboats were placed, and from there they tired into this ravine, 
knowing that our men had to cross it to reach the bluff at the river 
bank where the enemy made his successful last stand at sunset. It 
was in this creek and not in the Tennessee Eiver, half a mile far- 
ther, that Lieutenant-Colonel ]\Iiller's men watered their horses 
after the capture of Ross' Michigan Battery. With perhaps this 
command as an e:xception, at 4 P. M..i — prior to capturing this 
battery when it was half a mile above the gunboats, — it is doubt- 
ful if any of our horses were watered in the Tennessee Eiver. 

Through a lack of engineers, — a fact made known to the 
authorities at Eiehmond, a fact that was by them neglected, — we 
were not as thoroughly posted as we might have been, or perhaps 
as we shmdd have been, on the topography of Shiloh. With the 
present beautiful maps of that park under my eyes, I account 
for the error of General Polk, wlio, believing the Hornets' Nest to 
be only 400 or 800 yards from the river, instead of over one and 
a half miles, reported that "one more charge would have captured 
them on the banks of the Tennessee" : or for the error of Colonel 
Johnston in reporting, "Lindsay's cavalry watered their horses in 
the Tennessee," when it was in Dill Branch ; or for the error of 
General Bragg, as reported by Colonel Lockett, when he said, "One 
more charge, my men, and we shall capture them all." While these 
gentlemen believed us to be within stone throw of our goal, the 
Tennessee Eiver, we were in reality more than a quarter of a mile 
away, and we may have been as much as a mile and a half away. 
The enemy, having, of course, the advantage of a thorough knowl- 



33 

edge of the topography of the grounds, made their last stand on 
the river blnff, et finis coronat opus. 

The fruits of the battle of Shiloh were lost because of loss of 
time : that battle should have been fought on Saturday the 5th, but 
on account of General Bragg's delay in having his corps in line of 
battle at 4 P. M. instead of at 8 A. M. that day it had to be post- 
poned to the following morning, and the precious loss of two or 
three hours after the death of the general-in-chief brought us on 
the river banks after sunset, too late to capture the last stand of the 
enemy, who had been reinforced by a part of Buell's army. 

My object in the preceding pages has been to prove by official 
documents that General Beauregard's maneuver on the first day's 
fight was not a failure, and hoping that I have succeeded in con- 
vincing the reader of this fact, I pass over the second day's battle. 

Including Buell's and Lew Wallace's reinforcements that arrived 
during the night fallowing the first day's fight, the battle of Shiloh 
was fought with 107,147 men: 66,812 Federals, 44,335 Confede- 
rates. Major Eeed, in "Battle of Shiloh and Organization En- 
gaged," places the Confederates at 44.699. The Federals lost a 
grand total of 13,047: killed, 1,754; wounded, 8,408; missing, 
2.885. The Confederates lost a grand total of 10,699 : killed. 1,728 ; 
wounded, 8.012; missing, 959, or a percentage of killed and 
wounded of 15% for the Federals and 21 for the Confederates. 

The Confederates returned to Corinth with nearly 3,000 prison- 
ers, 30 cannons (some were abandoned for want of horses), 28 
flags, and thousands of small arms in lieu of our inferior ones. 
One regiment. Hill's of Tennessee, having come on the battle-field 
without any guns, armed themselves witli rifles picked up here and 
there or taken from prisoners. 

Is such a result a failure ? 



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